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to take the form of individual relations between reified “concepts”
and real kinds.
We can expect, however, that the external objects will play a
crucial role in learning in the very bootstrapping processes I just
described. Somehow our interactions with the external world lead
us to form one set of ontological convictions, one theory, rather
than another. Even if knowing our theories is all we need to explain
our current psychological functioning, we may well need to invoke
relations to the external world to explain why we have those
theories rather than others. These learning processes have been
almost completely neglected in cognitive psychology. If Millikan’s
externalism forces us to solve the problem of how our interactions
with the world lead to conceptual change, she will have provided
an important service to psychology as well as philosophy.
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Abstract: Externalism cannot work as a theory of concepts without
explaining how we reidentify substances as being of the same kind. Yet this
process implies just the level of descriptive content to which externalism
seeks to deny a role in conceptual content.
The recent antidescriptionist, externalist program for concepts has
impressed few empirical psychologists, as might be expected given
that it takes the most interesting question – Why do we have the
concepts that we do? – and seeks to provide an answer that has
little use for (or of ) psychological inquiry. The question is what
truly constitutes or defines the content of a concept. Description-
ists look to answer the question by identifying the collected set of
beliefs that a person has gathered about a class or type of thing.
Thus, to a descriptionist the concept “milk” is the set of property
descriptions which tend (generally) to hold true of a particular
class of stuff. According to which descriptionist theory you es-
pouse, these descriptions may involve a greater or lesser degree of
theoretical elaboration or stored experience. They may also be
partial or incomplete.
The problem with this descriptionist view, as identified by
Millikan and others, appears to be that it puts the cart before the
horse. How are we able to accumulate a set of beliefs about a
substance concept, if we cannot first have a reasonably reliable
means of knowing that a new experience is of the same kind as an
earlier one? How can we add a new belief to the set without
independently first identifying what our belief is about? To Milli-
kan the ability to reidentify something as an instance of the same
class is logically prior to the acquisition of descriptive properties
that may be generally true of the class. Conceptual content is
constituted by the real nature of the class that gives rise to these
(fallible) acts of reidentification. All our internal concepts do is
point to real classes in nature.
The problem of reidentification is clearly central to Millikan’s
argument. Yet how exactly can the process occur without involving
some form of descriptive representational format? As Millikan
points out, the ways in which we reidentify Mama, a cat, or a glass
of milk will all depend on different aspects of the perceptual and
sensorimotor information presented to us. Yet how are we to know
anything at all about a newly experienced object without transduc-
ing its physical characteristics through our sensory organs and
perceptual apparatus, thereby deriving a mental representation of
it? There can surely be no identification or reidentification with-
out a concomitant creation of a mental description.
Millikan answers this question by stating that such a description
need not imply property concepts since “the thought of a property
is not just a reaction caused by a property; it must play an
appropriate representational role ” (sect. 5, para. 7). She proposes
that descriptions may be used in reidentification, but that they
should not be representable in thought. It is puzzling how this
distinction between the “aspects” of objects used to identify them
and true “property concepts” that can also be represented in
thought is meant to be cashed out. Perhaps being representable in
thought means that a property can be isolated by attending to it as
a separable dimension (i.e., making judgments about it indepen-
dently of other dimensions), as well as being able to label it with a
language term.
Yet why should descriptionist accounts of concepts be limited in
their descriptive vocabulary to such a limited range of descriptive
power? It should be clear that there are many crucial aspects of
conceptual knowledge that fail this test. The way that we represent
the shape of “cat,” or the taste of “milk,” or the face, voice, and
smell of “Mama” are most unlikely to involve independently
isolated features or dimensions representable in thought. But why
should we not consider these concepts to involve descriptive
information, and why should we suppose that we perform the
recognition independently of the descriptive information we have
already stored with the concept?
A descriptionist account of concepts could not possibly get off
the ground if its representational power did not include the ability
to store and represent this kind of imagistic information. We are
clearly capable of representing a wide range of information that
could not be expressed in language. Verbal concepts must be
grounded in experience at some level. Given a realistic version of
descriptionist concept representation, it is hard to make sense of
Millikan’s distinction between unanalysed reidentification aspects
and “concepts of properties.” Millikan’s argument relies on a
notion of description that is so restrictive as to rule out any account
of concepts other than those nominal concepts with explicit
definitions such as prime number.
The target article also fails to address a major critique of
externalist theories, which should be familiar to all followers of this
debate. It is just not true that all of our concepts are tracking real
classes in the world. We may concede that natural kinds have an
independent existence as classes, but the majority of concepts
involved in everyday thought are not natural kinds. Take some of
the political and moral issues that have divided society in recent
years. Externalism seems to require that in each and every case
there be a real and objective answer as to which side is correct;
there is an external “good,” which we attempt to track through our
fallible concepts. This is an extreme position to be forced into.
Other concepts are defined relative to the possessor. Thus “home
town” and “favorite food” are defined relative to the person whose
home town or favorite food it is. For these concepts it is clearly false
to say that each concept possessor is tracking the same externally
real class. Yet how could the concepts then be defined except
through their descriptions, as they exist within that individual?
In summary, whatever the merits of the “pointing” view of
concepts as an account of very young children’s first attempts to
construct concepts, any psychologically adequate theory of the full
range of adult concepts will need to incorporate a strong descrip-
tionist component.
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Abstract: Millikan’s account of substance concepts fails to do away with
features. Her approach simply moves the suite of relevant features into an
encapsulated module. The crux of the problem for scientists studying
human infants and nonhuman animals is to determine how individuals
reidentify objects and events in the world.
